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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE “IMAGINATIVE 





 Irving Howe observed: “The imaginative sustenance that 
Yiddish culture and the immigrant experience could give to 
American Jewish writers rarely depended on their awareness or 
acknowledgement of its presence. Often it took the form of hidden 
links of attitude and value.”1 In this essay, I will focus on three of 
those “links of attitude and value,” and how they have shaped my 
approach to my religion and to my work as a constitutional lawyer 
and scholar. First is the value of dispute and dialectic as a bedrock 
principle in both the religious and legal realms. Second is an 
entrenched skepticism about power and a heightened awareness of 
power imbalances. Third is a respect for settled ritual and process, 
and how it comes into tension with the substantive goal of justice. 
 However, before considering these linkages, a few words 
about what I am not arguing here.  Our charge was to think about 
how our religious background influenced our attitudes toward 
constitutional law. I doubt the question is premised on the 
possibility of drawing simple cause and effect linkages between 
religious upbringing and constitutional interpretation. Certainly 
no such clear, linear linkages can be drawn in my case. This is 
partly because of the porous boundaries between my religious and 
cultural upbringing in New York City. But such linkages between 
background and meaning are also elusive because of the very 
nature of religious and constitutional interpretation, as I 
understand it. 
 The first question I struggle with is: how does a New 
Yorker—or at least a certain kind of New Yorker from a certain 
era—trace anything back to the influence of Judaism? Until I 
moved to Chicago as an adult, I did not understand what a luxury 
it was to be a Jew in New York, where one could simply imbibe 
certain attitudes and values and speech patterns and share jokes 
without having to make the choice to go out and learn Jewish 
culture. Or as my rabbi put it, only partially in jest: growing up in 
New York is like living the Torah. It is as if growing up in that 
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1  IRVING HOWE, WORLD OF OUR FATHERS: THE JOURNEY OF THE EAST 
EUROPEAN JEWS TO AMERICA AND THE LIFE THEY FOUND AND MADE 597 (1976). 
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city, one can act like the simple son (who is not motivated to learn 
about his faith) and reap all the benefits of the son who has 
applied himself and learned. More accurately, as I discovered 
years later, I was a maven of cultural Jewishness; but I was 
woefully ignorant about too much of my religion—so much so, that 
I made the decision to study to become a bat mitzvah at the age of 
fifty. I make this observation about growing up in New York to 
illustrate the challenge of answering a question that seeks out 
cause and effect between one’s religious identity and one’s adult 
belief system.  By the time I learned the formal tenets of Judaism, 
my attitudes toward the law and constitutional interpretation 
were pretty well formed. Consequently, there is no evidence in my 
life of that kind of chronological cause and effect between formal 
belief systems.  
 So rather than a neat correlation between background and 
belief, I posit something far messier, in which it is hard to isolate 
the religious values from the secular and cultural values in my 
Jewish home and almost entirely Jewish neighborhood in Queens. 
And the cause and effect linkage is just as malleable on the effect 
end of the equation. One of the problems with tying religious belief 
to legal attitudes is that in Judaism, so much is commentary.  This 
opens it up to all sorts of cherry picking. I have sometimes 
expressed impatience with what might be called the “family 
parsha”2 approach to bible study. In that approach, there is an 
attempt to find a politically correct message in every biblical 
reading, and to transform or paper over the parts of the Bible that 
offend modern sensibilities. Yes, I can make a good argument that 
the Torah should be interpreted as anti-death penalty, especially 
in light of current knowledge and conditions, as I did when I gave 
my own davar torah. But of course the counterargument is also 
quite supportable. The parallel to the perils of constitutional 
interpretation is obvious. There is danger in interpreting the 
Constitution as a kind of Rorschach test. There is also danger in 
the “family parsha” syndrome in which all the objectionable parts 
of the document are ignored or transformed, or at least assumed to 
be perfectible.  I am reminded of the classic Onion article entitled: 
“Area Man Passionate Defender Of What He Imagines 
Constitution To Be.”3 
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 In short, I do not take my topic to be a demand for 
demonstrable cause and effect.  It is an invitation to contemplate, 
rather than oversimplify. As it happens, the Onion article captures 
a central question for this discussion: what do I imagine the 
Constitution to be, and why do I imagine it to be that way? In 
other words, what historical, cultural and in particular religious 
influences shape my imagination? But on a deeper level, there is 
another question: how many imaginative interpretations can these 
documents, the Bible and the U.S. Constitution, accommodate? 
And this question leads to many other questions, and finally, to my 
central thesis: that questioning and disputation are the core 
Jewish values that inform my constitutional approach. 
 Although I cannot say with confidence what other religions 
believe, it does strike me that the Jewish emphasis on study and 
dialectic is one of its defining characteristics. In myriad ways, 
Judaism elevates the moral inquiry over the moral precept. If 
Rabbi Hillel is to be believed, there is only one fixed moral precept 
and the rest is commentary, and our affirmative duty is to go and 
study.  Moral value is attached to study itself, and to the 
evaluation and debate that grow from study. The teachings we are 
meant to live by come down to us as stories, or standards, that are 
open to interpretation, rather than as fixed precepts. The act of 
learning is the act of articulating and evaluating competing 
arguments.  
 Leon Wieseltier describes a tradition of argumentativeness 
that has “its most sophisticated and most robust home . . . in 
Judaism, from its beginnings in ancient rabbinical literature all 
the way to the present day . . . . In the Jewish tradition, 
disagreement is not only real, it is also ideal—at least in the 
unredeemed world, which is the only world we know.”4 One need 
not be an observant Jew steeped in Torah study to be raised in this 
argumentative tradition. It is the tradition of the dinner table. One 
need only be able to articulate and defend one’s argument and 
refute all the others. And in my house, like so many others in my 
neighborhood, one first needed to be able to get a word in 
edgewise.5 
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(2015), http://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/1491/the-argumentative-jew/. 
5  For example, in Deborah Tannen’s doctoral thesis, she recorded a 
Berkeley Thanksgiving with guests from various places. She found that everyone 
but the New Yorkers had a hard time getting a word in edgewise. Deborah 
Tannen, New York Jewish Conversational Style, 30 INT’L J. SOC. LANGUAGE 133 
(1981), available at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/tannend/NY%20conversational 
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 Argument and disputation are important values for several 
reasons.  They offer a superior form of knowledge to memorizing 
precepts or unquestioningly adopting consensus beliefs.  Argument 
offers all the advantages of the common law method over the 
continental method of developing a supposedly comprehensive 
system of rigid rules. Whether a moral norm applies under a 
particular set of circumstances, or in light of changing 
circumstances, can always be argued and revisited. Indeed, 
Weiseltier’s words make the connection to law clear: “Minority 
opinions are not obsolete opinions: They are preserved alongside 
majority opinions because their reasoning may one day be useful 
again.”6 
 More important, argument demands articulation and 
justification. It demands an articulation of the underlying 
principle and a debate over its reach and justification. In this 
regard, Judaism is a faith that does not often demand leaps of 
faith and blind obedience. Rather, it demands a good argument, 
based on text and commentary; one that is well supported and well 
presented.  And moreover, it demands reasoning and justification 
from rabbis and wise men along with everyone else. Conversely, it 
is not only rabbis and wise men who are entitled or expected to 
interpret and argue. The debate takes place here on Earth; not 
through divine revelation.  This point can be framed in yet another 
light. If there is no God’s eye view of truth; if truth arises from 
reasoned debate, it follows that a range of viewpoints must be 
tolerated and even respected. Those who claim to possess the 
universal perspective, or the only true perspective, are at odds 
with the core value of Judaism. This core value is the respect for a 
multiplicity of viewpoints, so long as they can be discussed and 
defended. This is the value that enables a pluralistic society. 
 This discussion of argument brings me back to Howe’s 
observation about hidden links of attitude and value. The values of 
debate and dialectic, as I have described them, are all readily 
applicable in an entirely secular context. They can be transmitted 
and deeply held without reference to religion. In fact, the bedrock 
belief in debate and interpretive leeway is arguably in significant 
tension with the idea of faith, if faith includes taking certain 
verities as sacred and insulated from debate.  
 If one accepts these values of inquiry and debate as 
primary, they would seem to apply to all governing texts, both 
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6  Wieseltier, supra note 4. 
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secular and religious. Judaism finds inherent value in testing the 
boundaries of principle through argument about interpretation. If 
one is raised in a culture deeply permeated by belief in the value of 
the argument itself, and in a culture that mistrusts the notion of 
rigid precepts that come from on high and that are insulated from 
scrutiny, it is entirely predictable that one would approach 
constitutional interpretation in a similar way.  This value does not 
depend on the nature of the text, which helps explain how Jewish 
values can be transmitted so thoroughly without reference to the 
formal tenets of Judaism. But it also raises the question of what 
makes these values non-secular or spiritual.  
I gave little thought to these issues until much later in life, 
when I recognized that there was a non-cognitive dimension to 
belief.  Judaism as I experienced it was very much about the value 
of process and debate. And the particular subset of Judaism I 
inhabited was one that teetered between Reform Judaism and 
doing nothing at all.  So it seemed to me that Reform Judaism 
itself, and the decision whether to participate in Reform Judaism 
in addition, added up to a continual debate about the importance 
of ritual and belief—a debate which ritual for its own sake rarely 
won. When I finally became a bat mitzvah many years later, I 
began to appreciate the power of ritual, or what it is that makes 
Judaism not just a system of beliefs but a religion.  
These musings have led me to reflect on why it is that so 
much of my teaching and scholarship have been focused on 
procedural areas. Although I was a lawyer at the American Civil 
Liberties Union before joining academia, I never taught 
substantive constitutional law.  I opted to teach federal courts. 
Although I was a lawyer for the State Appellate Defender before 
that, I never taught substantive criminal law. I opted to teach 
criminal procedure. I teach in fields that examine the tensions 
between fair process and just outcome. These are also fields that 
examine the extent to which process values (such as notice, 
predictability, uniformity and finality) can be evaluated without 
reference to the underlying substantive principles they are meant 
to facilitate.7 
One strand of this approach, evident in Judaism, is that 
justice does not exist in the abstract. Rather, justice is directly 
dependent on the quality of the evidence presented and the 
procedures used to present it.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  See generally Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227 
(1990). 
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One tenet of Jewish ethics is that a verdict is only as 
legitimate as the procedures used.  The procedures of the 
Sanhedrin, the ancient Jewish High Courts, contain some famous 
and remarkably psychologically astute examples of the veneration 
of procedure. One example is the practice of appointing different 
judges from case to case to investigate evidence pointing to guilt 
and innocence, which was meant to ensure that judges developed 
no vested interest in acquittal or conviction. Another example of 
the importance placed on procedure was the counterintuitive 
provision that a unanimous vote to convict in a capital case is 
reason not to execute—because it implies that the judges reached 
accord too easily, without thoroughly seeking exonerating 
evidence.  
These procedures reflect a deep understanding of the value 
of debate and dialectic. They also anticipate, by a couple of 
thousand years, contemporary understandings about the 
importance of creating fact-finding institutions that promote 
adversarial presentation of evidence, incorporate a naysaying 
function, and discourage tunnel vision.8  
 How these precepts inform my fields of law is complicated.  
It is crucial that Judaism, even of the most observant sort, 
venerates procedure but never at the expense of substance. It is 
not all about the means to the exclusion of the ends, but rather 
insists that both ends and means must be just. In Judaism, ethics 
can override settled rules and practices—as with certain 
exceptions to keeping the Sabbath when safety or compassion 
demands a variance from settled commands.  
 Procedure is a necessary but never a sufficient argument. 
Decisions of this nature require one to keep the ultimate ends of 
justice and its underlying principles in sight. I would like to think 
that a case like Coleman v. Thompson,9 in which the Supreme 
Court upheld the death sentence of a man whose lawyer missed a 
deadline by one day, would not be venerated as a case about 
federalism, as Justice O’Connor claimed,10 but rather condemned 
as a case in which justice loses out to a reliance on procedure and 
rules. I have recently been studying the jurisprudence of Judge 
Jack Weinstein,11 and one of his guiding principles—one that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and 
Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L. J. 475 (2006). 
9  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
10  Id. at 726. 
11  Susan Bandes, Empathy and Article III: Judge Weinstein, Cases, and 
Controversies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
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has specifically connected to his Jewish values—is that the 
command to do justice is an affirmative command.12  That is, 
standing by and watching injustice without intervening makes one 
culpable. Jeffrey Morris, in his book on Judge Weinstein, wrote 
about a telling counter-example to Coleman v. Thompson. In this 
case, a social security claimant failed to file a timely notice of 
appeal. However, instead of dismissing the case, Judge Weinstein 
went out and found the claimant, and helped him file his appeal.13  
This is a small, individualized story, but the larger 
principles that underlie it are important. These principles are the 
affirmative command to do justice, but also the concern about the 
effects of unequal power and unequal access.  The reality and 
impact of unequal access to power are among the most basic, 
visceral influences on the immigrant Jewish experience. These 
influences provide a prime example of a hidden link of value or 
attitude that was transmitted to my generation in countless ways. 
This link was transmitted in many forms, including suspicion and 
fear, self-protection, and loyalty toward and reliance on 
community.   
Returning to my earlier discussion of the importance of 
argument, unequal power led to a hyper-awareness of perspective. 
Furthermore, this hyper-awareness of perspective led to a distrust 
and skepticism toward those who claimed a universal perspective. 
It also led to a clear-eyed view of the rituals and pretensions of 
power. As Irving Howe points out, this is the underlying genius of 
the Marx Brothers movies, in which the elaborate structure of 
power is disassembled and treated with total disrespect.14 
 The awareness of power imbalances underlies the 
importance of fair process. At the same time, it provides an 
important counterweight to the reliance on process. For example, 
in my criminal procedure scholarship, I have been very wary of a 
reliance on substance that would threaten the integrity of process. 
Specifically, I have been wary of the innocence movement, to the 
extent it suggests that one can know in advance of process who is 
innocent, and therefore accord special protections to that group—
and conversely lesser protections to those we think in advance 
might be guilty. Ex ante rules that apply to the innocent as well as 
the guilty are essential to criminal procedure—both as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  See United States v. C.R., 972 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
13  JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND 
ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN 113 (2011).   
14  HOWE, supra note 1, at 567. 
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theoretical matter and as a means of ensuring continued support 
for restrictions on governmental power. 
At the same time, I have strongly critiqued habeas rules 
that consider a claim of innocence virtually irrelevant to a claim 
for habeas corpus relief, unless it happens to be accompanied by a 
procedural violation.  As Justice Blackmun explained, “the 
execution of a person who can show that he is innocent comes 
perilously close to simple murder.”15 Procedures metastasize and 
stray far from their original principles unless they are prodded 
and reexamined. 
 The discussion of habeas leads to another of my fields of 
study: federal courts. The danger of federal courts doctrine lies in 
its ability to justify substantive injustices by advancing what 
appear to be overarching ethically neutral values.  Here, the 
precepts of Jewish law are again instructive. When gatekeeping 
principles are arcane to the masses and accessible only to a select 
guild, they cannot be debated and subjected to the sort of scrutiny 
justice demands. The problem is not only that the principles are 
arcane; it is also that gatekeeping principles such as standing 
doctrine are not applied with consistency and predictability. At 
their best, these principles preserve important values like the 
separation of powers and federalism.  At their worst, they embody 
the most objectionable of Alexander Bickel’s passive virtues16—
specifically the use of obfuscation in order to maintain the Court’s 
power.  The challenge is to avoid the trap of entrenching unequal 
power and the trap of allocating power in a way that is not 
transparent and subject to debate. 
One way to avoid this trap is through a deeply pragmatic 
jurisprudential strain exemplified by Judge Brandeis, 17  Judge 
Posner18 and Judge Weinstein, to name a few. Rather than rest on 
the assurance of overarching principles, this strain is focused on 
how the doctrines are working in practice. It asks: how are 
principles like federalism and separation of powers working with 
the current Congress and the current Executive, rather than in 
relation to some abstract notion of what the political branches 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 446 (1993). See also Susan Bandes, 
Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. 
REV. 501 (1996). 
16  Alexander Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 
(1961). 
17  See generally EDWARD PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION (2000); Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True 
Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829 (2001). 
18  RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 74 (1995). 
  RUTGERS JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION             [Vol. 16 
	  
246 
should be doing? This strain is exemplified by a refusal to hide 
behind the formal descriptions of the duties of the courts and the 
political branches while avoiding the question of whether these 
duties are actually being carried out. Judge Weinstein in the 
Agent Orange cases, among others, acknowledged that ideally 
Congress would undertake the sort of mass tort resolution he took 
on, but recognized that Congress was doing no such thing.19  At 
that point, as he saw it, the federal courts have an obligation to 
help those the political branches will not help. The courts have an 
affirmative duty to do justice. This strain of jurisprudence is 
similarly characterized by its acknowledgement that 
interpretation requires choice, and with choice comes 
responsibility. This strain—an interesting mix of pragmatism and 
idealism—illustrates the interplay of ritual and substantive 
justice. Traditions and rituals deserve supremacy only to the 
extent they promote our deeply considered values; our publicly 
debated values.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
2064, 2087 (1997).  
